December 23, 2024
The recent decision by Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) to dismiss Prime Minister Garry Conille has sparked a fierce legal debate over the legitimacy of this resolution. Bernard Gousse, a former Justice Minister and law professor, has condemned the decision as unlawful due to two principal issues: the CPT’s functional incapacity and conflicts of interest among its members.
Functional Incapacity of the Council
According to Gousse, the CPT is currently plagued by functional incapacity. This stems from the decree of April 10, 2024, which outlines the structure and operations of the CPT. Article 2 of this decree clearly states that no individual under criminal indictment can serve on the Council. However, three current members face corruption charges, with cases now under investigation by a magistrate. This automatic disqualification undermines the quorum needed for any valid deliberations. In fact, the decree from May 23, 2024, mandates a minimum of five members to ensure the legality of Council meetings. Thus, any decision made to remove the Prime Minister under these conditions is legally void.
Conflict of Interest within the CPT
Beyond functional incapacity, Gousse highlights a conflict of interest issue. The CPT reportedly pressured to appoint a new Justice Minister who might sway the Government Commissioner to support the indicted members. Gousse argues that this situation creates a scenario where the CPT acts as both judge and jury, violating principles of transparency and integrity in administrative decisions. Controlling the Justice Ministry could allow the CPT to influence the outcome of ongoing legal cases, instructing the Commissioner to issue a “no case to answer” for the accused members.
The Illegality of the Decision’s Substance
Gousse asserts that the decision to remove Garry Conille is not only procedurally flawed but also unconstitutional. Article 158 of the Haitian Constitution states that the Prime Minister is accountable solely to Parliament, which alone has the authority to dismiss the Prime Minister through a vote of no confidence. Although the CPT temporarily holds the powers of the President of the Republic during this transitional period, it lacks the constitutional authority to dismiss the Prime Minister. Additionally, no current legal framework governing the political transition, including the April 3 Agreement, grants the CPT the power to terminate a Prime Minister’s duties.
Institutional Void and Overreach
Gousse argues that the CPT appears to be exploiting an institutional void to justify its decision. The Government Action Control Body (OCAG), which was designed to oversee the executive branch, has not yet been established. In this void, Gousse emphasizes that only the political groups instrumental in creating the CPT possess the moral authority to withdraw support for the current government. Without adequate oversight, any CPT action aimed at dismissing a Prime Minister constitutes an abuse of power. This could amount to “forfeiture,” or the illegal exercise of powers not conferred by law.
Implications for Rule of Law in Haiti
The CPT’s attempt to remove Garry Conille raises essential concerns regarding the rule of law in Haiti. Gousse warns that the CPT’s decision sets a dangerous precedent, jeopardizing the democratic framework in Haiti. Rule of law necessitates decisions founded on clear principles of legality and transparency, yet in this case, CPT actions risk creating widespread mistrust toward transitional institutions.
In summary, the CPT’s decision appears to violate procedural and substantive legal norms, underscoring the fragile state of Haitian institutions amid political transition. Gousse calls for a return to constitutional standards to secure the nation’s stability during these uncertain times.